1. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U. S. 317, 325-26 (1984) (quoting Holmes' "aphorism" that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic").
[Vol. 99:1081 ask, how can we say that a suspect is compelled to be a witness against himself if he answers "I shot my wife" to the officer's first question of "what happened last night?" Where is the compulsion? Despite my efforts, even the conservative students think it is unfair for police to question suspects without telling them that they need not answer.6
The second experience I offer is that of reading hundreds of ap pellate opinions deciding whether the police complied with Miranda. If you have read a few, you will not be surprised at my basic findingonce the prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language that the suspect understands, courts find waiver in almost every case. Miranda waiver is extraordinarily easy to show -basically that the suspect answered police questions after saying that he understood the warnings.7 This waiver process bears little resemblance to waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial where the prosecutor is not permitted to badger the defendant with requests that he take the wit ness stand. Indeed, neither the prosecutor nor the judge can even comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.8 As most defen dants are represented by counsel at trial, the decision to take the stand, and waive the privilege, almost always is made after advice and careful thought.9 By contrast, the Miranda version of the Fifth Amendment permits waiver to be made carelessly, inattentively, and without counsel.10 6. In a dissent two years prior to Miranda, Justice White said that "it would be very doubtful" that a statement would be admissible if the police explicitly told the suspect he had to answer questions. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dis senting). Of course, this is different from finding a constitutional duty to provide warnings that suspects need not answer (and White also dissented in Miranda), but White's concern about police creating a false duty to answer points in the direction of informing suspects that no duty exists.
7. See, e.g. , North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) ; see also infra notes [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] and accompanying text.
8. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) .
9. The defendants who proceed pro se will also have had a rather extensive colloquy with the trial judge in which, among other warnings, she will tell the defendant that he has a right not to take the witness stand. See, e.g. , Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (noting that the trial judge "inquired into" pro se defendant's "awareness of his rights"). We do not know, of course, how thoroughly a pro se defendant understands this right or how carefully he considers it. Indeed, we do not know for certain how carefully or thoughtfully defendants who are represented by counsel make the decision about testifying, but we would like to believe that lawyers perform competently and that defendants are rational actors.
10. I confess that the relative ease with which the state can secure waivers of the privi lege in the grand jury context muddies my point. Grand juries, however, have been consid ered sui generis in other contexts. In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) , for exam ple, the Court held that courts simply lack the authority to require the prosecutor to disclose favorable evidence to the grand jury, in part because the grand jury is not textually assigned to any of the three branches of government and, therefore, exists independently of govern ment. This unique status probably derives from the historic role of the grand jury as a group of citizens seeking evidence of crime in their midst. As the Court has put the common Jaw principle: " [T] he public has a right to every man's evidence." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) . But no one ever claimed that every man owes the petit jury at trial his These experiences suggest that almost everyone thinks fairness re quires telling suspects that they do not have to answer police ques tions, but courts find waiver of the right not to answer on any evidence that the suspect understood the warnings. Is this really an application of the venerable privilege not to be compelled to take the witness stand at trial? More is going on here than meets the eye.
It is good that law does not depend completely on logic. Judged on that score, Miranda remains quite mysterious. I wish to identify some of these mysteries and offer a new way of thinking about Miranda that may explain some of the puzzles. Whatever the Miranda majority con templated, my thesis is that later, and somewhat hostile, Courts have transformed Miranda from a case about the Fifth Amendment privi lege against self incrimination to one about due process.
In Part I of this Article, by way of background, I outline some of the mysteries left open by the Court's Miranda decision and later ju risprudence. In Part II, I explore the theoretical and practical disjunc tion between Miranda and the Fifth Amendment privilege. Part III then draws on the conceptual and historical bases of due process to show how a due process understanding may provide answers to some of Miranda's mysteries. Part IV demonstrates how the Miranda doc trine and subsequent case law is better explained under a due process notice theory than under any version of the Fifth Amendment privi lege theory. Part V offers some tentative thoughts about how best to justify a Miranda requirement in the Due Process Clause. In Part VI, I offer some brief comments on Susan Klein's alternative theory for Miranda. Finally, I conclude that "truth-in-labeling" -the impor tance of which is emphasized by Professor Klein -requires that due process theory takes its rightful place in explaining Miranda and its progeny.
I. M IRANDA ' S M YSTERIES: A N O VERVIEW OF THE A RGUMENT
The most basic mystery of Miranda is identifying the full extent of the holding itself. As Stephen Schulhofer points out,11 there are actu ally three holdings. The Court held, first, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to custodial po lice interrogation. Second, the Court held that the pressure of custo dial interrogation is inherently compelling for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. As to the third holding, the opinion is less than clear. Professor Schulhofer argues that the Court held that every response to custodial interrogation is compelled unless warnings are given.12 evidence, or that suspects owe the police their evidence. Thus, the grand jury waiver process seems a less apt comparison to police interrogation than the process at trial. (Vol. 99: 1081 Perhaps this is true, although the third holding does not necessarily follow from the second. It might be that some suspects who answer in the face of compelling pressure are not actually compelled to answer. This might be so for three reasons. First, humans surely have different tolerances for how well they can withstand compelling pressures. Sec ond, the inherently compelling pressure of police interrogation comes in quite different levels of pressure. The question "what happened last night?" might be inherently compelling but it is of a different order of magnitude from the forty hours of interrogation, thirty of it with no break, that the defendant faced in Lisenba v. California.13
Third, humans who answer police questions might have independent motives to answer, motives that have nothing to do with police compulsion as it is traditionally understood. In Lisenba, for ex ample, the suspect did not confess until confronted with a confession of his confederate; Lisenba said that he would never have confessed but for the statement of the confederate.14 While the police disclosure of the confederate's confession motivated Lisenba's confession, courts have never found that providing truthful information to a suspect is compulsion. The distinction is between enabling the will of the suspect to operate with more information, which is not compulsion, and over bearing the will of the suspect. Like all distinctions in confession law, this one can be spun to gossamer fineness, but in Lisenba, the Court found that the suspect exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer. 15
If it is possible to imagine a noncompelled response to inherently compelling police pressure (and the Court has on several occasions in sisted that this is more than just an imaginary possibility),16 then the narrow holding in ' Miranda is less than clear. Did the Court hold that every response is· compelled unless accompanied by warnings and waiver or only that warnings and waiver are required because of the great risk that any given response will be compelled? Justice White, in his Miranda dissent, noted both of these formulations of the potential holding, ultimately deciding on the former -that Miranda held "any answers to any interrogation to be compelled regardless of the content and course of examination. "17
13. 314 U.S. 219 (1941) .
14. See id. at 240.
15. Id. at 241.
16. See infra notes 3 8-41 and accompanying text.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) .
If the Court held that every statement made by suspects in re sponse to police interrogation is compelled under the authority of the Fifth Amendment, this conclusive presumption would presumably ap ply in all situations just like a finding of "real" Fifth Amendment compulsion. This is the "strong" reading of Miranda's relationship to the Fifth Amendment. The conclusive presumption makes it easier to decide when the constitutional provision has been violated, and noth ing about the presumption suggests that a presumed violation is some how less wrongful, or deserves a lesser remedy, than a "real" violation.
This introduces another Miranda mystery. The Court chooses sometimes not to apply the Miranda presumption of compulsion even though "actual" compulsion would produce an outcome in favor of the defendant. In these contexts, the Court insists that the defendant loses unless he can demonstrate "real" compulsion. Consider New York v. Quarles,18 where the Court held that Miranda warnings are not re quired when the police are asking questions designed to advance pub lic safety. A statement ("the gun is over there") is therefore admissible even though no warnings are given and Miranda's conclusive pre sumption would otherwise be fully engaged. Although the Court with drew the prophylactic protection from this category of cases, it did not withdraw the pre-Miranda protection against involuntary, compelled, or coerced statements.19 Thus, the Court assured the reader that the suspect who loses the benefit of Miranda's conclusive presumption, in cluding Quarles himself on remand, can argue that his statement was "actually compelled by police conduct that overcame [his] will to re sist. "20 As Quarles makes clear, the Court has over the years adopted the less expansive, or "weak" reading of Miranda's holding -not that every statement is compelled but that the warnings are necessary be cause the risk of compulsion is so great. If the warnings are not given, the presumption of compulsion will usually, but not always, require suppression of statements made in response to custodial interrogation. Justice Scalia in his Dickerson dissent suggests that the Court lacks the authority to structure a presumption in that way.21 I disagree22 but the [Vol. 99:1081 novelty of the Miranda presumption requires a better explanation than the Court has given us. Dickerson explains Quarles with the cli che that no constitutional rule is absolute. But this misses the point that Miranda has exceptions where the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege does not.23 By what standard does the Court decide which contexts should not benefit from Miranda's conclusive presumption? This we are never told -another Miranda mystery.
I wish to "solve" these mysteries by introducing a new explanation of Miranda. In effect, I argue that the Supreme Court has carved out a specialized niche in the Due Process Clause for Miranda-style due process. On this view, the notion of a regularized criminal process in cludes the right to be warned that no duty exists to answer questions asked during custodial interrogation.
I want to be clear about the kind of claim I am making. It is de scriptive, not normative. I am not claiming that a due process under standing of Miranda is the best approach to the problem of police in terrogation. Nor am I claiming that a due process protection is what the Miranda Court thought it was creating (though much language in the opinion is at least consistent with this explanation 1030 (2001) . The Quarles general public safety exception, however, is far broader than the ticking bomb emergency. More importantly, these speculations do not alter the reality that the Court has never identified, even in dicta, an exception to the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege. 1826, 1838 (1987) . Alfredo Garcia ably expresses a somewhat different explanation that Miranda was intended to ensure "the continued viabil ity of confessions as an instrument of law enforcement." Alfredo Garcia, ls Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 474 (1998) . These views are not completely antithetical because the Court might have intended to create a bright line that caused more suppressions and yet left a robust role for interrogation.
apply to custodial police interrogation that both created a bright line rule and made suppression more likely than under the due process co ercion test. The substitution of Fifth Amendment "compulsion" for due process "coercion" as the relevant inquiry was almost certainly in tended to lower the bar and make it easier for defendants to suppress confessions. Focusing on compulsion also made Miranda's crucial pre sumption easier to justify. It is plausible to claim that police interroga tion without warnings is always compelling. It is much more difficult to claim that it is always coercive.26 But Miranda's bright line has been substantially blurred by the post-Miranda cases.27 Whatever one calls the pressure of police inter rogation today, it does not always render a response compelled under the Fifth Amendment because the Court does not always apply the presumption. My descriptive claim is that the Court has transformed the Miranda doctrine into a due process protection.
Susan Klein argues that I bend the due process category to make Miranda fit.28 She argues that I have not identified a due process inter est to be protected or, assuming a due process interest can be identi fied, that the bare notice requirement is insufficient to protect the in terest.29 While I acknowledge that Miranda-style due process is not a mainstream due process doctrine, my argument is that the Court has already done the heavy lifting of moving Miranda from the Fifth Amendment privilege to its next door neighbor in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause. Other than to demonstrate that doctrinal "fact," then, my only job is to find the due process theory that is the closest fit. In sum, I argue that the Court has already ac complished the rearranging of the due process furniture that Professor Klein finds objectionable. Whatever due process has been understood to require in the past, it is pretty clear that the Due Process Clause is sufficiently flexible (or amorphous) to accommodate Miranda-style due process.
26. I indulge here the standard linguistic and philosophical view that coercion entails a greater magnitude of pressure than compulsion. Prior to Miranda, the Court had never drawn that distinction in its confessions cases. Miranda was, I believe, intended to be the first in a series of cases to hold that compulsion can be found where there is insufficient pressure to constitute coercion. See Schulhofer, supra note 11. The post-Miranda cases, however, con tinued to talk of compulsion as if it were synonymous with coercion, see supra note 19, an analytical move that made it easier to find no "actual" compulsion when carving out excep tions to Miranda. 27. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's public safety exception "unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear line heretofore established"). There are, I believe, three permissible accounts of Miranda's rela tionship to the Fifth Amendment privilege. First, as Schulhofer argues, it might be that every statement made to the police interrogators, in the absence of warnings and waiver, is conclusively presumed to be compelled and thus inadmissible on the authority of the Fifth Amendment.30 On this reading, Miranda is a "strong force" applica tion of the privilege. A second possible account is that the privilege applies differently in the interrogation room than it does in the court room and that sometimes the presumption of compulsion applies and sometimes it does not. I call this a "weak force" application of the privilege. The third account is that Miranda is a prophylaxis that pro tects the privilege rather than being an application of the privilege. The second and third accounts might appear to be the same but they are not.
The "weak force" application of the privilege suggests that Miranda is constitutional and thus beyond the power of Congress to change in any way. The prophylactic understanding, on the other hand, leaves room for Congress to legislate provided the legislation is at least as protective as the Miranda prophylaxis.31 An example of a prophylaxis that is not an application of a constitutional right is the Blockburger presumption that a necessarily included offense is the "same offense" as the greater offense for purposes of preventing mul tiple punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.32 That presump tion is a proxy for legislative intent on the multiple punishment issue and may therefore be overridden by the legislature. It is not part of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Court made clear in Missouri v. Hunter when it held that "crystal clear" legislative intent to punish both offenses rebuts the Blockburger presumption.33
The "strong force" understanding of Miranda is open to criticism for being an ahistorical extension of a right intended to apply only to trials and other formal hearings. Other policy criticisms build on the This "preventive medicine" explanation of Miranda minimizes the role of the Fifth Amendment in explaining why statements must be suppressed. On this view, not all violations of Miranda produce consti tutional harm, giving the Court flexibility to approach issues about the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule as well as exceptions to its pre sumption of compulsion. While a prophylactic explanation might not be the best understanding of what Miranda originally sought to ac complish, or the best approach to the problem of police interrogation, nothing keeps a Court from modifying its doctrine. This explanation of Miranda, whether right or wrong as a policy matter, is coherent.
The difficulty is Dickerson, where the Court seemed to suggest that Miranda is more than a prophylactic rule or, perhaps, that it is a con stitutional prophylactic rule that Congress has no power to modify. Given the Court's citation to City of Boerne v. Flores42 for the proposi tion that "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions in terpreting and applying the Constitution,"43 and the Court's applica tion of this principle to Miranda, it is difficult to avoid reading Dickerson as holding that Miranda is constitutional -either in a strong sense, as co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, or in a weak sense, as a constitutionally required prophylactic rule.
If Miranda is best understood, in light of Dickerson, as constitu tional in the strong sense, the exceptions and doctrinal limitations made on the authority of the prophylactic theory seem doomed. If Portash is the right approach to the use of compelled statements to impeach, and if Miranda is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, then Harris must be overruled. This analytical turn is, I think, Paul Cassell's nightmare. He challenges Miranda, loses, and takes down with him the doctrinal limitations placed on Miranda. Unjustify permitting the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach defendants. Rather, it simply assumed that the interests in reliable fact-finding were heavier than what ever interests supported a total ban on statements presumed to be compelled. If, on the other hand, we accept the Dickerson dicta that Miranda is constitutional in the weak sense -that it is a constitutionally re quired prophylactic theory -the exceptions survive but without a theory that explains why the Fifth Amendment privilege deserves a constitutional prophylaxis that does not apply to some cases in which the Fifth Amendment itself would apply. While that kind of prophy laxis is not illegitimate, it requires an explanation. One explanation is that the Court is making the Fifth Amendment privilege do work it was never intended to do and, consequently, has had to remodel the privilege. In effect, to view Miranda as a weak version of the Fifth Amendment privilege requires that we recognize the Fifth Amendment as having a strong force in formal proceedings and a weak force in police interrogation. Nothing keeps the Court from having a Fifth Amendment privilege with a strong and a weak force, but it is a conceptually unsatisfying interpretation of a single guaran tee.
A due process theory offers an alternative account that avoids the problem of constructing a theory of the Fifth Amendment with weak and strong forces. Due process requires notice in other contexts before rights to liberty or property are lost. Why not in the context of police interrogation? I think a permissible understanding of Miranda is that it protects the liberty interest in not being subjected to custodial inter rogation by providing notice that the suspect can terminate the · inter view. While this is a novel "liberty interest," it is one that Miranda it self seemed to contemplate. The Court said that "custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty."45 And the Miranda solution, after all, was to tell the suspect that he has a "right to remain silent" as a way of terminating the deprivation of liberty that attends custodial interrogation. This "right," however, does not exist outside the context of police interrogation. Witnesses can be subpoenaed, given immunity, and compelled to testify consistently with the Fifth Amendment privilege.46 Defendants who take the witness stand can be fully cross-examined.47 No "right to remain silent" exists when the "real" Fifth Amendment [Vol. 99:1081 privilege is involved.48 Miranda is so loosely connected to the Fifth Amendment privilege that it promises a right that the privilege itself cannot deliver. This should suggest rethinking the relationship of Miranda to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Even if we assume that Miranda is constitutional in the weak sense, and thus not very closely connected to the privilege, we require an alternative theory -such as due process -to explain when the Court will apply, or refuse to apply, the presumption or when it will create a broader right than the Fifth Amendment creates in its strong force form that applies to formal proceedings. Yale Kamisar's classic study of confessions law that paved the way for Miranda draws heavily on equal protection to conclude that suspects should be told of their Fifth Amendment privilege before being interrogated.49 Drawing a parallel to cases requiring the state to provide indigent defendants with a transcript and a lawyer to handle their appeal,5 0 Professor Kamisar argued that "respect for the individual and securing equal treatment in law enforcement" require the state to make counsel available to suspects who face police interrogation and to warn them that they need not answer.51 As Professor Kamisar put it: "To the ex tent that the Constitution permits the wealthy and the educated to 'de feat justice,' if you will, why shouldn't all defendants be given a like opportunity?"52 If the Fourteenth Amendment helps us decide to ap ply the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation, rather than just in formal proceedings, Fourteenth Amendment due process may help decide when and how the Miranda presumption should be ap plied.
48. The text and history are also inconsistent with a "right to remain silent" view of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The text forbids compelling a witness to testify. That is far from a general right to remain silent. Moreover, Albert Alschuler has concluded that no one in the eighteenth century would have thought of the common law privilege as creating a right to silence. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent , 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996) . 49. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 4-11, 64-81. Professor Kamisar's paper laid out the theory that the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the police interrogation room and that notions of equal protection required providing suspects notice that they did not have to answer questions.
50. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript) . About the only erroneous prediction Professor Kamisar made in his Eq ual Justice paper, see supra note 24, was that Douglas would turn out to be a more important right to counsel case than Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) . The prediction was based on Professor Kamisar's view that the Equal Protection Clause was go ing to play a key role in deciding how to apply the criminal procedure guarantees. The Court's appetite for using the Equal Protection Clause in this way, however, turned out to be quite limited. See, e.g. , Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (refusing to extend Douglas to a discretionary second appeal to the state supreme court even though indigents are unques tionably disadvantaged by not having appointed counsel).
51. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 79-80.
52. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 80.
On this understanding of Miranda, the difficult questions have been, and will continue to be, about when and how to apply the pre sumption, questions not answered by asserting that Miranda presumes Fifth Amendment compulsion. My due process account fills in this gap either by operating as the mechanism by which we decide when the "weak force" Fifth Amendment applies or operating as a free-standing source of the duty to warn. On either view, it is the Due Process Clause that does the analytical work.
AND H ISTORICAL B ASIS OF D UE P ROCESS
Professor Klein argues that the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself is the only right one needs, or is permitted to use, to craft doctrines that warn of a right to si lence.53 In effect, she. claims that the existence of the criminal proce dure guarantees of the Bill of Rights sucked most of the "criminal process" oxygen from the Due Process Clause, exhausting it of content in the criminal context -at least where there is a plausible nexus be tween a particular right and the government action being challenged.54 But I believe that the criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights leave room for the Due Process Clause to work when we think about the controls that should apply to police interrogation.
History supports the idea that due process has independent life in the criminal context. The clause derives from the Magna Carta re quirement that all persons are entitled to the "law of the land," a hoary phrase that has been understood for centuries to require a regularized process before the state can deprive someone of life, lib erty, or property.55 The Framers of the Fifth Amendment created a right to "due process of law" that courts understood to be equivalent to the Magna Carta right to the "law of the land. "56 The Fifth Amendment privilege is a separate protection in the Fifth Amendment from that of due process (the two clauses are located next to each other, separated by a comma). Separate provisions must mean something different, and when the privilege applies, it does in deed provide all the process that is due. But how would the Framers have understood the application of the privilege?
53. See Klein, supra note 23, at 53.
54. This additional condition is needed to preserve a place for due process or equal pro tection to operate in areas when no specific right seems to apply -for example, to create a rule that equal protection forbids a prosecutor to act if motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) Scholars as diverse as Yale Kamisar and John Henry Wigmore agree that the privilege has a different history from that of the com mon law rule forbidding the use of involuntary confessions.57 The privilege grew out of the concern with the power of the monarch to compel political and religious dissenters to take an oath to tell the truth in formal hearings.58 Part of the objection to this process was that the state could force anyone to take the oath, even if it lacked a basis to suspect the particular individual, thus allowing the monarch to seek out and destroy its opponents. Part of the objection, however, was that the state should not have the power to compel a person to destroy himself even if the state had adequate suspicion. In 1651, Hobbes stated that even a "justly condemned" person has "the Liberty to dis obey" the sovereign when it orders him to "kill, wound, or mayme himselfe [sic] ."59 From this principle, Hobbes derived the following corollary: "If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign [sic], or his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe [sic], he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confess it; because no man ... can be obliged ... to accuse himselfe [sic] ."60 Here, what is being protected is the autonomy of the subject and the corresponding right to ignore the order of the sovereign to confess a crime. The idea made the voyage across the Atlantic. In 1677, the Virginia House of Burgesses "de clared that forcing suspects to answer incriminating questions under oath was incompatible with their natural rights."61
The common law simultaneously developed another principle that overlapped the Hobbesian right to ignore the sovereign's order to ac cuse oneself. Confessions had to be voluntary to be admissible. The underlying concern was not autonomy as much as it was reliability of the fact finding process. For example, Blackstone noted that confes sions made out of court are "the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony, ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises of favor, or menaces, seldom remembered accurately, or reported with due precision, and incapable in their nature of being disproved by other negative evidence."62 If we were able to ask the Framers whether any part of the Fifth Amendment was relevant to interrogation of suspects, they would al most certainly reply in the negative, asserting that the common law prohibition of involuntary confessions would do the job. If we insisted, however, that something in the Fifth Amendment be put to that task, the Framers would likely propose the Due Process Clause rather than the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. They would see the latter provision as preventing Congress or the judiciary from creating procedures that would require individuals to answer questions under oath in a criminal trial.63 If the common law were sud denly not available to protect against the use of involuntary confes sions (as it is not available today except to the extent it survives in cases decided under the Due Process Clause), the Framers would probably agree that part of the "process" that is "due" is the right not to have involuntary confessions used to prove guilt.
Indeed, I believe we can push this thought experiment a bit fur ther. It would be silly to claim that the Framers contemplated any kind of Miranda-style notice of the right not to answer questions. But con sider how they might respond if they accepted the Miranda Court's finding that, to prevent compelled responses to police interrogation (not under oath), it was necessary to warn suspects that they have no duty to answer police questions. Now we ask again: Given that this right exists and must be located somewhere in the Bill of Rights, where would it go? I cannot prove my answer, of course (which is why this is a thought experiment), but I am confident that the Framers would locate this new right to a particular kind of process in the Due Process Clause rather than in the right not to be compelled to answer questions under oath. The law that existed in 1791 drew a very bright line between compelling answers under oath (a procedure that was subject to the common law privilege) and compelling answers not un der oath (a procedure subject to the common law rule prohibiting the use of involuntary confessions).
Having enlisted the Framers of the Fifth Amendment to support my argument, I now turn to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend ment. It contains a Due Process Clause worded identically to the one in the Fifth Amendment, thus extending the due process limitation on government power to the states. Whatever else is true about the de bates over the Fourteenth Amendment -for example, whether the Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights64 -one fact is 63. That Congress has never attempted to require that kind of procedure simply attests to the core settled meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g. , George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819 REV. (1997 clear. The Framers did not think that the Bill of Rights guarantees ex hausted the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment imposed limi tations on state criminal processes. Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, who was on the Reconstruction Committee that drafted the Amendment, favored a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that incorporated the "personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution."65 He noted, however, that the Amendment also protected due process of law and equal protec tion of the laws.66 Howard thus contemplated that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights left room for the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to operate as an independent limitation on the states. As an example of the protection of due process and equal protection, he said: "It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged."67 While the distinction between equal protection and due process is unclear in Howard's example, it seems that Howard found a role for due process to play in preventing this hanging. If so, it is a role that is independent of the first eight amendments. Moreover, the example strongly suggests a kind of "law of the land" rule that black men are due the same process as white men.
An opponent of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the following example of how the Amendment would limit state criminal processes:
[I]f a murderer be arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to be hung, he may claim the protection of the new constitutional provision, allege that a State is about to deprive him of life without due process of law, and ar rest all further proceedings until the Federal Government shall have in quired [into the case ].68 This example assumes a free-standing due process protection by which state criminal proceedings can be evaluated.
The Court has explicitly turned to due process in other criminal contexts even though the issue seemed, logically, to lie within the am bit of a particular procedural guarantee. For example, the Court ana lyzed whether a state must allow a defendant access to exculpatory re cords within its control as a due process question, even though it might logically be thought to be an issue of Sixth Amendment compulsory process.69 Additionally, the Court found due process violated when a state's evidence law prevented the defendant from putting on his ex- culpatory evidence even though the specific deprivations were of the Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and to have compul sory process.7 0 Does due process provide a comfortable "home" for notice that a suspect does not have a duty to answer police questions? Consider an other thought experiment suggested by Yale Kamisar.71 Suppose the Warren Court had decided that it was too much of a stretch to apply the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation room. Could it have used its due process cases to create a Miranda-like rule? I believe the answer is yes.
In Blackburn v. Alabama,72 the Court held involuntary on due pro cess grounds the confession given by a suspect suffering from mental illness. Blackburn's due process analysis tracks Miranda's Fifth Amendment privilege analysis pretty closely. Both are concerned with the ability of the suspect to make a decision based on "a rational in tellect and a free will. "73 Blackburn holds that a confession not so based is a violation of due process. The piece that is missing in Blackburn is a global concern with the effect on suspects of all police interrogation, not just the particular one under the Court's micro scope. In the next three years, however, the Court began to expand its due process focus.
In Lynumn v. Illinois,74 the Court commented that the suspect "was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly 'set her up.' There was no friend or adviser to whom she might turn. "75 Though the police also made a threat (to have her children taken from her), it is significant that the Court considered the coercive effect of being "encircled" by police without "friend or adviser to whom she might turn." These coercive pressures would be true in almost every case of custodial police inter rogation.
In Haynes v. Washington,76 decided two months after Lynumn, the Court found compulsion without a threat beyond that of further in communicado interrogation. The concern in Haynes was the effect on suspects generally of incommunicado interrogation. Here is what the Court said, near the end of its opinion -a passage that surely presages Miranda: conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is neces sary to make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused.77
The Miranda Court could have relied on Blackburn, Lynumn, and Haynes to hold that custodial police interrogation is inherently a dep rivation of due process liberty unless the suspect is warned that he has a right to terminate the interrogation. The Court chose a different path, of course, probably in part because the due process path would have required the Court to overrule prior cases permitting some pretty rough interrogation techniques78 as well cases refusing to find due pro cess violations even when the suspect requested counsel.79 As the Fifth Amendment privilege had only applied to the states for two years when Miranda was decided,80 there were no contrary Fifth Amendment precedents to be overruled. Moreover, it is difficult to read the Miranda opinion without getting the sense that the Court thought the Fifth Amendment privilege was a clearer, cleaner solution than a thorough overhaul of the due process doctrine. Now that the Fifth Amendment solution has been blurred and warped, however, there is no reason the Court cannot reconsider what is the best doc trinal home for a Miranda rule. If a due process home is a better fit in the twenty-first century, the Court should embrace it.
Is due process a better fit? One reason to prefer a due process un derstanding, touched on earlier, is that Miranda waiver looks very dif ferent from waiving the privilege at trial. The Miranda opinion hints that the Court expected a high percentage of suspects to invoke the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Had that occurred, one could argue that the Miranda protection of the privilege was sturdy enough, in an informal way, for rough parity with the formal court room application of the privilege. If most suspects say nothing that could be used against them later, or if they request counsel to advise them about answering police questions, there would be little practical difference, in the total universe of cases, between the Miranda protec tion and that of the "real" Fifth Amendment privilege. But that is not the reality of how Miranda operates. Roughly eighty percent of all suspects waive Miranda, and the vast majority of those suspects in criminate themselves.81 This is not parity with the courtroom applica tion and its waiver standard. As Professor Kamisar said in 1965, "if the privilege is easily waived, there is really no privilege at all."82 The Court's language in Miranda could be read to require consid erably more to prove waiver than has turned out to be the standard. The Court wrote: "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly. and intelli gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."83 But the whole concept of Fifth Amendment waiver is oddly attached to the "weak" force of the Fifth Amendment that seems to explain Miranda. Part of what has given Miranda critics traction all these years is the incongruity of asking whether a suspect has waived his right not to be compelled to answer questions. How can one waive the right not to be compelled? It makes sense to think about waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege in the context of a trial -by choosing to testify, the defendant waives the right she has not to be subpoenaed to testify. But because police can not compel suspects to answer under penalty of contempt, the notion of waiving the right not to be compelled in the interrogation room borders on the incoherent.84 This conceptual oddity makes the task of fashioning a waiver standard in the police interrogation room compa rable to that in the courtroom more difficult, even if the Court had the political will to attempt to do so.
Due process, by comparison, does not require an affirmative, counseled waiver. The prisoner facing loss of good time credits and the parolee facing parole revocation can waive the right to a hearing by simply not appearing after notice has been given.85 To be sure, one could describe the non-appearance in these cases as forfeiture, rather than waiver, but nothing turns on the formalistic label that is applied. What counts is that the prisoner and the parolee had notice and failed to exercise the right about which they were notified. The suspect in the police interrogation room can similarly waive Miranda by listening to the warnings and talking to the police. Talking to the police is a failure to exercise the relevant right in the same way as failing to appear at the parole revocation hearing. Waiver can be found even in a case where the suspect refuses to sign the waiver form and states, "I will talk to you but I am not signing any form."86 To compare that to the decision to take the witness stand in a criminal trial is to diminish the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The distinction: between Fifth Amendment waiver at trial and due process waiver becomes clearer in two of the Court's Miranda cases. In Connecticut v. Barrett,87 the Court upheld waiver when the suspect answered orally even though he said he would not sign a statement un til his lawyer appeared. In Colorado v. Sp ring,88 the Court found waiver even though the suspect did not know he was going to be inter rogated for a more serious crime than the one for which he was under arrest. Do these cases meet due process standards for notice? I think so. In both cases; the suspect knew he did not have to answer police questions and that he could have a lawyer present during the interro gation. That he lacked perfect information in Sp ring or made an illogi cal decision in Barrett does not mean he lacked notice of the conse quence of answering police questions or of his right to counsel and to terminate the interview. The argument is more difficult, however, if one has to conclude that either Spring or Barrett was no longer react ing to the inherent compulsion of police interrogation when they an swered questions while holding a warped or incomplete understanding of what they faced.89
In addition to the way waiver is proved, what happens after waiver further distinguishes Miranda from the Fifth Amendment privilege that attends the trial. At trial, the defendant who waives the Fifth Amendment privilege and takes the witness stand has "his lawyer ... at his side, not only to shield him from oppressive or tricky cross examination which angers, upsets, or confuses him, but to guide him on direct examination."90 The Court has even said that "to prevent a 89. One reader of a draft, citing Barrett and Spring, suggested that the Miranda version of notice is too thin to qualify as due process notice. Perhaps, but this argument proves too much. If Miranda notice is too thin for the Due Process Clause, it is surely too thin to warn effectively of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
90. Kamisar, supra note 24, at 13 (internal footnote omitted).
defendant's lawyer from guiding him on direct examination constitutes a per se violation of 'fundamental fairness. ' "91 When a suspect waives Miranda, the only limitation on police in terrogation is the Due Process Clause, the very protection that Miranda found unacceptably parsimonious. And in the hands of later courts, the due process protection is pretty parsimonious. Alfredo Garcia provides a dramatic example of what courts will permit police to do once they have a waiver.92 In this case, the courts found a confes sion voluntary despite thirty hours of continuous interrogation without sleep followed by another fourteen hours of interrogation after the suspect slept for six hours. The Garcia example is not an isolated case, nor is it in any way antithetical to Miranda doctrine as it has evolved. A North Carolina case, State v. Jackson,93 provides another example. Jackson was a murder suspect. He waived Miranda and was inter viewed for three hours and released; the next day, again waiving Miranda, he was questioned and told that the clothes he wore the day of the murder were stained with blood, and that tracks made by his tennis shoes were found at the scene of the crime. Both statements were false. Jackson did not confess. Ten days later, he voluntarily came to the police station and waived Miranda; he was shown a bloody fingerprint on a knife. The police said that the print on the knife was Jackson's and that an eyewitness could identify him leaving the murdered woman's apartment carrying a knife. Both statements were, once again, false. In addition, the officers warned that, if Jackson denied what he had done, they would "go into court and ... testify that the defendant was a black man raping and killing white women. "94 Jackson confessed, and the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was admissible under the Due Process Clause.
Miranda doctrine could have developed differently; perhaps the Fifth Amendment privilege contains a non-waivable core that forbids trickery and oppressive interrogations inconsistent with the "free choice" rationale in the Miranda opinion. The Supreme Court, how ever, has not provided guidance on these questions, and the state courts permit considerable deception and pressure without finding a due process violation.95 Thus, for eighty percent of suspects, the law 91. Id. at 16 (citing, and later quoting from, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594 (1961) that applies is not in fact Miranda but the law that Miranda sought to change. It seems odd, at best, to say that the Fifth Amendment re quires suspects to be warned that they have a privilege not to answer police questions, but that once they agree to answer, they are in the due process soup where police can lie and cheat to get a confession. This view of the Fifth Amendment impoverishes it.
This evidence suggests that Miranda is not really about the Fifth Amendment privilege. No, my students had it right all alongMiranda is about fair notice that suspects have no duty to answer po lice questions. Once the police give that notice, the basic rationale of Miranda is satisfied and everyone is happy. The suspect gets the notice he deserves, the police get a statement, the prosecutor gets a convic tion, and the appellate court will affirm (as long as the suspect under stands the language in which the warnings are given).
Because the Due Process Clause sometimes forbids the state from taking advantage of structural inequities in the level of information,96 it makes sense to think of Miranda as a due process case rather than a case about compelled self-incrimination. But why limit the due process notice to custodial interrogation? Structural inequities in information about the right of the suspect not to answer questions or to refuse to give consent to search exist in a myriad of contexts.97 Why not a right to due process notice every time any state actor asks a question of anyone?
A superficial answer, at the doctrinal level, is that this was as far as the Miranda Court was willing to go. A deeper kind of answer is found in the reason the Due Process Clause requires notice. Here, I agree with one of the Court's premises in Miranda, if not its ultimate conclu sion. There is a rough and ready difference in the level of pressure be tween typical cases of police approaching an individual on the street and asking a question, and police conducting a sustained interrogation of a suspect who is under arrest.98 Under arrest, in an unfamiliar room, 96. For example, due process forbids the state from using a probate system that relies on constructive notice to creditors when the creditor is known or might reasonably be ascer tained. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that no Miranda warn ings were necessary because the suspect was not under arrest or otherwise in custody even though he was a parolee who was being interrogated in the police station); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a consent search is valid if the consent is vol untarily given based on the totality of the circumstances, without requiring that the suspect knew of the right to refuse consent).
98. Professor Kamisar agrees here. Taking Miranda at its literal word that it applies to anyone who is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) , Professor Kamisar argued in 1966 that the case for ap plying Miranda to stops on the street was much more difficult. See Kamisar. supra note 25, at 60 n.8. The bright line between an approach on the street and an interrogation blurs as we add arrest and interrogation elements to the street stop -for example, detention for several suspects face police interrogators who are capable of relentless ques tioning and who imply, if they do not state, that the suspect must an swer. This is about as extreme a pressure to answer as interrogation can produce short of physical coercion or threats of physical coercion. I can adopt, therefore, the Miranda Court's factual premise that cus todial police interrogation creates inherently compelling pressure to answer the questions.
My due process explanation does not, however, have to take the next step and conclusively presume that any answer in the absence of warnings and waiver is therefore compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Compelling pressures can exist without causing the actor to behave in a particular way. In Robert Nozick's classic account of coercion, for example, the last condition states that part of the ac tor's reason for doing X (for confessing) must be to avoid (or lessen the likelihood of) the thing that has been threatened.99 If that condi tion is not met, the actor has been subjected to coercion but has not been coerced. '00 In other words, the existence of a threat does not en tail that the threat caused the actor to do something.
Compelling pressures can exist without the suspect succumbing to them. We act out of many motives that intersect in complex psycho logical ways, and we are differentially susceptible to varying levels of pressure. To ask the suspect what he did last night might be, in some way, compelling if he thinks he has a duty to answer, but it is far less compelling than the pressure that Lisenba faced during forty hours of interrogation.101 Moreover, recall that the Court found that Lisenba confessed not because of the interrogation but because he chose to shift blame to his confederate. The single most telling criticism of the Miranda conceptual structure is the assumption that every answer to every question posed by police interrogators is compelled. It flies in the face of our pragmatic, intuitive view of human nature as well as what philosophers have taught us about compulsion. As far back as Aristotle, philosophers noted that the decision to act in a way one does not want to act is voluntary, in a sense, because it is a decision made by the actor . 1 02 minutes and intense questioning -but the Court is committed to drawing a line at arrest for purposes of triggering Miranda To be sure, the free will premise underlying Aristotle's view of voluntariness ultimately defeats the notion of an involuntary confession. Wigmore famously observed, "As between the rack and a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is none (Vol. 99:1081 Miranda had to embrace the pragmatically and philosophically du bious premise that every response is a compelled response to justify suppressing statements under the authority of the Fifth Amendment privilege in every case where warnings are not given. If one is disposed to accept that premise, however, it is not clear that a set of warnings delivered by the actors who are creating the inherent compulsion is a sufficient remedy. Miranda is a glass half full no matter how it is held to the light, a recognition of the essential compromise that has always been at the heart of Miranda. If the inherent compulsion of police in terrogation really compels every response, a better remedy seems re quired. If the inherent compulsion does not compel every response, we are left with a "weak force" understanding of Miranda without a clear account of when and how it will differ from the "pristine" privi lege.
A due process right to notice that suspects do not have to answer police questions does not require the assumption that the suspect is compelled to answer in every case where warnings are not given. The compelling pressures of custodial police interrogation simply provide a justification for limiting the notice to that category. Viewing the warnings as required under a due process notice theory avoids the "glass half full" conceptual problem. It accomplishes precisely what the "weak force" explanation accomplishes but provides an account, however imprecise, of when warnings are required and when the fail ure to warn should not lead to suppression. It achieves what the Court now achieves with Fifth Amendment privilege "strong" and "weak" forces by moving the "weak" protection into the Due Process Clause and thus avoiding the awkwardness of finding two quite different kinds of protection in a single constitutional guarantee.
IV. THE M IRANDA D OCTRINE U NDERSTOOD AS R EQUIRING D UE P ROCESS N OTICE
The Miranda opinion is itself somewhat consistent with a notice explanation. Some of the examples the Court drew from the interroga tion manuals do not create what is normally considered compulsionthe less voluntarily chosen." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 824 n.l (Chadbourn rev. 1970) . One could quite plausibly array the various approaches to the confession problem on a free will-determinism spectrum with Aristotle, Wigmore, and Lisenba near the free will pole and Miranda near the determinism pole. For some thoughts on the various historical and philosophical approaches to confessions, see George C. Thomas (1991) . Whatever approach one adopts, some gross distinctions are possible -for example, asking a suspect whether he has anything to say versus a relentless interrogation with threats of physical coercion. Miranda's casual assumption that these two situations are indistin guishable for Fifth Amendment purposes has always been controversial.
for example, feigning sympathy or pretending to give the suspect an excuse for the killing. In each of these situations, the suspect makes a free choice, based on the information available to him. What makes these routines questionable is not compulsion, as traditionally under stood, but the unfairness that comes with making a choice based on incomplete or false information. This would not have to be described as compulsion. It might better be described as a failure of informa tion.103
The focus in Miranda generally is on the police-created atmos phere that leads the suspect to believe that he has an obligationlegal, moral, or pragmatic -to answer police questions. For example, in discussing how to deal with a request for a lawyer, the interrogation manuals recommend that the suspect be told to save himself and his family the expense because all the police want is the truth from the suspect. "You can handle this by yourself. "104 In discussing how to re spond to a refusal to answer questions, the manuals suggest noting the natural inference that anyone would draw from a refusal to answer, that the suspect is guilty. "So let's sit here and talk the whole thing over."105 At one point, the Court concludes, after analyzing the police training manuals, that the interrogator's aim is to "persuade, trick, or cajole [the suspect)" into confessing.106
As Miranda critics are quick to point out, however, persuasion and cajoling are not compulsion, at least as it is classically defined.107 In deed, even trickery may not rise to the level of Fifth Amendment compulsion.108 The focus in the opinion is on Miranda-style compul sion, a concept that seems more concerned with a level playing field and the "free choice" about answering police questions than anything else. Supplying information was thought sufficient to permit a "free choice," which strongly suggests that the compulsion concerning the Court was a failure of information rather than the level of pressure in any individual case. · 103. To be sure, on a "thick" account of compulsion, one with its roots in notions of positive liberty, a failure of relevant information can be viewed as compelling. See generally Thomas, Philosophical Account, supra note 102 (describing that account but rejecting it as an explanation of Miranda's holding).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454 (1966) 291, 303 (1980) , for example, the police engaged in what appeared to be a form of trickery that the state supreme court characterized as "sub tle compulsion," but the United States Supreme Court nonetheless found the resulting statements admissible. For a discussion of other forms of trickery employed by the police during interrogation, see generally Magid, supra note 95; White, supra note 95. (Vol. 99:1081 To say that Miranda was concerned with failure of information as to rights, however, is not to diminish its importance. The right to be told what one's rights are before they are waived is part of the funda mental belief structure underlying Anglo-American law. Our law as sumes autonomous agents capable of acting in their own best interests. This entails at least some level of information about the consequences of conduct before one acts in a way that causes a right to be lost. That is, I believe, the explanation of Miranda's long life. Whether or not the Fifth Amendment privilege should apply formally to the interrogation room, it might be that our culture believes, at some intuitive level, in precisely the kind of notice that Miranda requires. Miranda did not, after all, forbid police interrogation or require lawyers. It left the deci sion of whether to answer police questions up to presumably autono mous agents who have been given information about the conse quences of answering. It might be that this is simply the fairest solution to the interrogation problem.
Viewing Miranda as due process fairness explains Doyle v. Ohio,109 where the Court held that the state cannot cross-examine a defendant about his failure to mention his exculpatory defense when he was ar rested and given Miranda warnings. The Court found an implicit "as surance" in the warnings that silence would "carry no penalty." Given this implicit promise, the Court held that "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. "110 Here, the warnings create the due process right, rather than vice-versa,m but Doyle shows an intimate connection between the warnings and the overall question of fairness to suspects.
As we saw earlier,112 viewing Miranda as providing a threshold level of fairness in the interrogation room, rather than ameliorating the pressure of police interrogation, explains the Miranda waiver cases. It also explains why Dickerson embraced Miranda, however tepidly. Miranda was not a candidate to be overruled because, in Dickerson's words, "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our na tional culture. "113 Translated: our culture, and even the police, accept the fairness of telling the suspect that he does not have to answer po lice questions and if he does it will hurt his case. 111. Indeed, in later cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition against using silence to impeach an exculpatory trial story when the police did not give That Miranda is more about due process notice .than neutralizing inherent compulsion seems clear enough in Duckworth v. Eagan.114 Duckworth is rarely analyzed in the literature,115 perhaps because it suggests a due process framework and thus is not easily analyzed un der traditional approaches. In Duckworth, the police gave the follow ing warnings:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.116
The problem here, of course, is that the warnings seem to promise an appointed lawyer only if the suspect is arraigned at some later time. If Miranda is understood as neutralizing the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, Duckworth might or might not be consistent with Miranda. Four members of the Duckworth Court dissented in an opinion by Justice Marshall that accused the majority of a "continuing debasement" of Miranda.117 Marshall concluded that "[a]n unwitting suspect harboring uncertainty [about when he could have a lawyer] is precisely the sort of person who may feel compelled to talk 'voluntar ily' to the police, without the presence of counsel, in an effort to extri cate himself from his predicament. " 11 8
Marshall quoted from a state case holding similar warnings unconstitutional under Miranda:
[The suspect] is effectively told that he can talk now or remain in custody -in an alien, friendless, harsh world -for an indeterminate length of time. To the average accused, still hoping at this stage to be home on time for dinner or to make it to work on time, the implication that his choice is to answer questions right away or remain in custody until that nebulous time "if and when" he goes to court is a coerced choice of the most obvious kind. 119 114. 492 U. S. 195 (1989 845, 852 (Ind. 1972 ) (DeBruler, J., con curring in result) (alteration in original)). [Vol. 99:1081 Marshall is co:rrect that, if the principal function of the warnings is to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, the warnings in Duckworth don't seem particularly well fitted for the job.12 0 If the principal idea, however, is to provide notice that a suspect does not have to answer and notice that his answers can be used against him in court, these warnings work just fine. However much pressure Eagan still felt to answer police question s after the warnings, he had been given the requisite notice that he did not have to talk to the police at all and that he could consult a lawyer before answering questions.
Duckworth contrasts quite nicely, on a due process theory, with Edwards v. Arizona.121 In Edwards, the Burger Court held, without dissent,122 that when the suspect requests counsel, police cannot reini tiate interrogation in the absence of counsel even if the suspect later waives his rights.123 Putting Duckworth and Edwards together as due process cases, they stand for the rather simple proposition that the state must deliver what it promises, but it can make at least some changes in the Miranda model warnings. The state does not have to promise to provide an appointed lawyer during the current encounter with the police (Duckworth) but if the police promise counsel, the po lice must keep the promise to provide a lawyer during questioning if the suspect requests one (Edwards). Viewed as due process cases, rather than as an antidote to inherent compulsion in the interrogation room, these cases make perfect sense.
Michigan v. Mosley,124 decided six years before Edwards, reached the opposite result when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent. The police terminated the initial interrogation, but a different team of interrogators questioned Mosley two hours later about a different crime, after once again providing warnings and, this time, getting a waiver. The Court held that this procedure complied with Miranda. The distinction between Mosley and Edwards seems consistent with, if not compelled by, a due process theory. The two kinds of promises are different. If the state promises the right to a lawyer during interroga tion, and then begins to interrogate without providing a lawyer, that is a bright line failure to provide what is promised. If, on the other hand, the state promises that the suspect has a right to remain silent, the act of asking again, hours later, and about a different crime, is not the same kind of bright line failure. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Mosley, when the suspect invoked his right to remain silent, the police 120. See also Kamisar, supra note 115, at 554. 123. See also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (making clear that Edwards requires the lawyer be physically present at any subsequent interrogation).
423 U.S. 96 (1975).
immediately ceased questioning. The warnings do not promise that the police will never again seek to talk to the suspect, and the police ac tion in Mosley thus seems consistent with a due process notice theory.
We saw earlier that the Court in Quarles held that a police officer who asks a rape suspect the whereabouts of a gun in a public place does not have to give Miranda warnings. The Court performed a cost benefit balance to conclude that the threat to public safety more than outweighed the benefit of a rule designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. What is missing, again, is an account of why the Fifth Amendment privilege should not apply when a gun might be in a supermarket at midnight. As Justice O'Connor recognized in her dis sent, "since there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial interrogation any less compelling, a principled application of Miranda requires that respondent's statement be suppressed."125 That seems right even if Miranda is only a "weak force" application of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
If Miranda is best understood as requiring due process notice that the suspect does not have to answer questions, however, O'Connor's dissent misses the point. The majority's balance of the equities might be wrong, but the attack that the Court is ignoring Fifth Amendment compulsion goes nowhere. Due process is sufficiently flexible to per mit -Professor Klein will likely say "amorphous enough to al low"126-different procedures depending on the cost to the party charged with the responsibility of providing notice. The Court requires actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an es tate, for example, but notice by publication suffices for all other credi tors.127 The Court in Quarles concluded that the cost to suspects in terms of bearing compelling pressures is outweighed, in this instance, by the cost of greater risk to the public that follows from requiring no tice. This is a starkly due process form of analysis. I personally think the Court got the balance wrong in Quarles, but the very act of bal ancing the social good versus the value of the Fifth Amendment privilege suggests that Miranda has become, at heart, a due process case.
Once we realize that the presumption of compulsion is not a doc trinal imperative, the Court's tendency to balance the equities when deciding how best to apply the Miranda exclusionary remedy becomes coherent, if not necessarily the best policy. Return to Harris v. New 125. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's holding that the state ment was admissible; she concurred in the judgment that the gun should be admitted, though she used a different analysis to reach that result.
126. Klein, Miranda's Excep tions, supra note 28.
127. See Tulsa ProrI Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) . [Vol. 99:1081 York,128 holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach. This holding is incoherent if Miranda creates a "strong force" presumption of compulsion, but it can easily be squared with a due process notice requirement (or a due process mechanism for determining when the Miranda "weak force" version of the privi lege should apply). Although the analysis is cursory, Harris appears to be balancing the decreased incentive for police to give the warnings against the loss of trustworthy evidence129 -a balance similar to what it would do later, and more clearly, in Quarles.
The Court also balances when deciding whether a Miranda viola tion taints other evidence discovered by means of the violation. In Michigan v. Tucker,130 for example, the Court had to decide whether to suppress the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered through a Miranda violation. On one side of the balance the Court put "the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce."131 On the other side, the Court put the interest in creating an effective sanction for the violation of a constitutional right. That side of the balance was lighter in Tucker than in Miranda because Tucker's statements were suppressed. The question was whether to "extend the excision further ... and exclude relevant testimony of a third-party witness."132 That balance came out against the defendant, as it did in the Fourth Amendment context.133
Physical evidence found by means of a Fourth Amendment viola tion is, on the other hand, generally suppressed as the poisoned fruit of the violation.134 If a statement is "actually compelled" -as in Brown v. Mississipp i135-a court would likely suppress physical evi dence discovered from the statement. To admit the evidence is to re ward the state for using coercion. To suppress the evidence brings con fession law into parity with the Fourth Amendment. As to Miranda violations, however, the Court said in Oregon v. Elstad136 that they have no poisoned fruit. The rationale should be familiar by now: er rors "in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures ... should 128. 401 U.S. 222 (1971 134. There are, of course, exceptions to this derivative evidence rule, but the details of Fourth Amendment law are beyond the scope of my paper.
135. 297 U. S. 278 (1936) . The deputy sheriff and a gang of white men tortured confes sions from black suspects. The deputy sheriff admitted the torture in court.
136. 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . But my notice theory does provide a more satisfying explanation for the Elstad holding that a violation of Miranda does not taint a later statement taken in compliance with Miranda. The Court sought to jus tify its holding by repeating the Tucker balance: "[T]he absence of any coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales -trustwor thiness and deterrence" that would support a broader rule of exclu sion.139 If the Miranda concern is really about inherent compulsion, however, one can argue that Elstad gave the second statement know ing he had already incriminated himself and thus likely felt the com pelling pressures of police interrogation all the more acutely. This ar gument persuaded the state court and the Elstad dissenters. Under a notice understanding of Miranda that does not presume compulsion, however, Elstad has no plausible argument. If all Miranda requires is notice, Elstad has to lose, for he received the notice that was required, and then made a statement.
There are, I believe, only four ways to line up Dickerson with Miranda and the many cases interpreting Miranda. First, one can sim ply accept the idea of a Fifth Amendment "weak force" privilege that requires notice but often permits a balance between the suspect's in terests and the state's interest in the admission of reliable evidence. This leaves things as they were prior to Dickerson and is the least jar ring solution. Those who, like me, find the idea of a "weak force" privilege to be ad hoc and unsatisfying have three choices. They can follow Justices Scalia and Thomas in Dickerson and insist that the "weak force" cases have deconstitutionalized Miranda. In that event, 137. Id. at 309. The facts of Elstad make clear that the officer did not intentionally omit the warning to gain an advantage, nor did he seek to exploit the first statement by, for ex ample, reminding Elstad that he had already incriminated himself. Presumably, the deriva tive evidence consequences of that kind of police conduct remain unsettled. Another option is to insist, dicta in Dickerson notwithstanding, that Miranda meant to apply a "strong force" privilege to the police station house. This requires revisiting, and probably overruling, most of the exceptions and limitations created by later Courts. The final op tion, like the first one, leaves the case law undisturbed. It is to find an other constitutional "home" for Miranda, to drop the pretense that everything about Miranda is an extension of one kind or another of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Miranda is, I have argued, about fair ness. Its logical home is in the Due Process Clause. If Miranda is viewed as creating a due process notice requirement, it makes perfect sense (whether or not it is the right approach for policy reasons) to have a public safety exception, to permit the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes, and to decide that Miranda has no derivative evidence consequences.
The due process option is a bit more jarring than accepting Miranda as a "weak force" privilege. I can, however, reduce the dislo cation. If the reader is wedded to the idea that Miranda is about the Fifth Amendment privilege, I have argued that the Court's "weak force" doctrine, in which the Miranda presumption does not apply to certain categories of cases, is best understood as using a due process theory to decide when to withdraw the presumption of compulsion. Thus, whether Miranda's notice requirement is wholly located in the Due Process Clause or whether the Clause simply tells the Court when not to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Miranda's presump tion of compulsion, it is the Due Process Clause that is doing the heavy lifting.
V. F ITTING MIRANDA INTO D OCTRINAL D UE P ROCESS
In this Part, I offer some tentative thoughts about how to fit Miranda into established due process doctrine. I begin with the Miranda opinion. While the Court relies heavily on the Fifth Amendment privilege, it does so in a way that stresses autonomy and human dignity, as well as the inherently compelling pressures of police interrogation. The denial of autonomy and human dignity by custodial interrogation might constitute a deprivation of a due process liberty interest.
In describing the cases before the Court, the Miranda opinion noted that, "[i)n each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an un familiar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent [in two of the cases]."141 While there was no evidence of "physical coer cion or patent psychological ploys ... in none of these cases did the of ficers undertake ... appropriate safeguards at the outset of the inter rogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice. "142
Still talking about the cases before the Court, the majority noted that the "interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This at mosphere carries its own badge of intimidation .... not physical in timidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity."143 Perhaps most squarely relevant to my due process point, the Court concluded that "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on in dividual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals."144 These descriptions of the interrogation procedure persuade me that forcing a suspect to endure that procedure amounts to a deprivation of a due process interest in liberty.
The Fourteenth Amendment sometimes requires notice before the State imposes a restriction on liberty. A parolee, for example, has a right to notice of the potential revocation of his parole.145 A prisoner has a right to notice that the prison officials intend to deprive him of good time credit on his sentence.146 In the custodial interrogation con text, the suspect might have a due process liberty interest not to be forced to endure interrogation. Even though the suspect is in custody, the police interrogation is a further deprivation of his liberty. To be sure, the marginal deprivation of liberty associated with enduring po lice interrogation is not as great as the marginal deprivation of liberty associated with loss of parole or good time credits. It is not clear, how ever, that the extent of the marginal deprivation is necessarily disposi tive.
If interrogation intrudes on a due process liberty interest, the due process liberty cases seem to require warnings that a suspect has a right to remain silent and a right to consult with counsel, both of which permit the suspect to terminate the procedure that is depriving her of liberty. The warning that the answers can be used against her in court is more difficult to justify under this conception of the liberty interest that is at stake. Perhaps it can be justified as informing the suspect of reasons why she might want to terminate the interrogation. Due process is, as I have said, flexible.
A second sort of due process liberty interest is the suspect's option to make an informed choice whether to answer police questions and risk providing the state with evidence against him that increases the risk of conviction. This is perhaps analogous to the parolee's interest in notice and a chance to contest the parole revocation hearing or the prisoner's right to notice and a chance to contest the loss of good time credits. The suspect has both a stronger and a weaker argument than the parolee or prisoner. It is stronger because a suspect is not yet con victed. He still benefits from the presumption of innocence, and the scope of his potential loss of liberty is almost total, rather than incre mental as in the case of the parolee and, particularly, the prisoner, both of whom are already under state control. The suspect's argument is weaker because the notice given the prisoner and the parolee per mits them to challenge directly the grounds the state has for a further deprivation of liberty. The suspect has to make a more attenuated causal argument that this liberty interest is threatened. He faces depri vation of liberty by means of a conviction only at a later proceeding, where the state has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reason able doubt, and where the state likely has evidence other than the statement he gave without making a fully informed choice to answer. Dicta in some of the due process cases support this kind of causal chain. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,147 the Court noted that "[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."148 Given the fre quent expression of concern in Miranda about free choice to decide whether to answer questions, it is conceivable that the lack of notice about the effect of answering infringes on the suspect's liberty interest in deciding whether to cooperate in his own conviction. The focus in the Miranda opinion is on the harm that would result from a statement that "was not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights."149 If this argument is right, it provides ample justification not only for a duty to warn of the right to silence and to counsel but also for a duty to warn a suspect that his answers can be used against him in court.
Police interrogation threatens a suspect's liberty in another, more fundamental way. One historical explanation of the Fifth Amendment privilege asserts that it is wrong to compel someone to reveal his in nermost self, his conscience, his beliefs. At least when the privilege 147. 339 U.S. 306 (1950 was taking shape in England and colonial America, religious beliefs were constitutive of persons. To compel someone to disclose his re ligious belief was thus to "take" an aspect of his liberty.
Miranda quoted with enthusiastic approval language that the privilege grants a defendant the "right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. "150 If the police do not warn the suspect that he has no duty to answer questions, they are intruding on this private en clave and infringing on the suspect's liberty interest in choosing whether to reveal his innermost thoughts. Of course, suspects today are not in any way like the religious dissenters of Tudor England. Rather, my claim is that we view state compelled responses to ques tions as an invasion of the liberty interest not to disclose what we wish to keep secret. If the police warn a suspect that he has no duty to an swer questions and the suspect proceeds to give a statement, then it is fair to presume that the suspect chose to disclose his private thoughts. There is, then, no infringement of liberty.
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment might have contem plated a similar liberty interest. There is abundant evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to protect the free expres sion of ideas and, thus, to protect the person who utters words.151 A colorful example of this concern was Congressman Price's observation that "if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his opinion in reference to slavery he was treated without much ceremony to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon the rail."152 Though these remarks referenced the time before the abolition of slavery, the speaker made clear that nothing had changed in the post-bellum South. Others in Congress echoed the concern about the lack of free speech in the South. Representative Mann of Pennsylvania noted that whoever "went down South was obliged to put a padlock on his mouth."153 The South's repression of dissent on the race question was an issue of national importance. Michael Curtis has concluded, " We can thus accept that the Framers and ratifying legislatures wished to require the states to permit freedom of speech and expres sion. When the Court began to entertain the idea that Fourteenth Amendment due process protected freedom of expression from state infringement, the analytical structure centered on the "liberty" pro tected by the Due Process Clause.156 Although the liberty to decide whether to answer police questions is different from the liberty to ex press opinions without penalty, there are common threads. In both cases, the one claiming the liberty interest is facing the power of the state, and the state is seeking to use speech to harm the interests of the speaker/suspect.
If we understand the relevant liberty interest as a right to decide what the state is permitted to learn about our thoughts, it helps ex plain Schmerber v. California.157 The issue in Schmerber was whether, by forcing the extraction of Schmerber's blood and thus revealing that he was intoxicated, the state was compelling him to be a witness against himself. The Court held that Schmerber's blood was not being a witness against him even though, as Justice Black pointed out in his dissent, the blood was "testifying" against Schmerber just as surely as if it had taken the witness stand.
Justice Black commented that it was a "strange hierarchy of values that allows a State to extract a human being's blood to convict him of a crime but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers."158 At one level, there is much to commend Black's view that compelling a defendant to bear witness against himself violates the Fifth Amendment without regard to whether the human will is involved in the act of witnessing. One response to Justice Black is that when the state requires the human actor to choose to incriminate himself, it forces him to give up some aspect of the human personality, some di mension of autonomy or dignity. This is a satisfying explanation for why the Court refused to accept Black's argument that Schmerber's blood was a witness against Schmerber. On this view of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it creates a kind of liberty interest in not facing compelling pressures to provide answers at trial. There is no particular reason why the Due Process Clause could not embody a similar liberty interest as applied 156. See, e.g. , Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925 ). 157. 384 U.S. 757 (1966 .
158. Id. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting). The reference to "compelled production of his lifeless papers" was to Boyd v. United States , 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Fifth Amendment as pect of which the Court has subsequently overruled. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) . Nonetheless, sometimes the act of producing papers can itself be a testimonial act (as by implicitly authenticating documents) that cannot be compelled. Thus, Justice Black's larger point remains valid.
to police interrogation. This liberty interest would likely require a warning that the suspect need not answer.
I have tried to demonstrate that custodial interrogation without warnings directly infringes a due process liberty interest in deciding what information to provide police interrogators during custodial in terrogation. I have also argued that a suspect should have a right to terminate the police interrogation, which is, itself, a deprivation of his due process liberty interest. If the reader is unpersuaded by either of these "pure" due process arguments, I am prepared to fall back on an alternative argument -one that least roils the waters of the Miranda doctrine. Even if Miranda's presumption of compulsion is based on the Fifth Amendment privilege, when the Court decides whether to apply the Miranda exclusionary rule, it must engage in a due process balance that puts fairness to the suspect on one side and the interests of the state in accurate fact-finding on the other.
I concede that my arguments might not be adequate to justify cre ating a Miranda due process liberty interest if we were starting from scratch. Nor do I think that the Miranda Court intended to create a due process right to notice. I take the Court at its word that it sought to apply the Fifth Amendment privilege to the police interrogation room. The timidity of the application, however, coupled with a fairly hostile reaction to Miranda by later Courts, has, I believe, transformed Miranda into a due process case. To be sure, Professor Klein is right to claim that my theory mixes up procedural and substantive due process, producing a mulligan stew unrecognizable in the Court's current due process doctrine.159 My reply, of course, is that it is the Court that has done the mixing, but that the stew is reasonably tasty.
VI. . A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT SUSAN K LEIN ' S A RTICLE
I applaud Professor Klein's account of prophylactic rules. She ar gues that these rules should be considered temporary place holders necessary to protect an underlying constitutional right but "fully open to revision by Congress, federal executive action, and state legislative, executive or judicial action." 1 60 This account is consistent with the dis tinction I have drawn between "weak force" application of the privi lege and a true prophylactic protection. It contemplates a rich and continuing dialogue among the Court, Congress, state legislatures, state and federal law enforcement agencies, and social scientists. The social scientists will tell us whether a particular right needs prophylac tic protection and the shape and scope of the prophylaxis, and the other groups will contribute their expertise and communicate their political needs.
159. See Klein, Miranda's Exceptions, supra note 28.
160. Klein, supra note 23, at 1054. [Vol. 99:1081 The frank recognition that the Court often creates rules designed to protect constitutional values, rather than always interpreting the Constitution itself, would go far toward creating a legitimacy for criminal procedure doctrine that has been largely missing since the Warren Court began to expand the criminal protections available in state court. Professor Klein apologizes for not being sufficiently cyni cal,161 but I think she's right to call for this kind of dialogue. She admits to a concern about whether the Court is institutionally capable of do ing a good job with empirical data -a concern that I share. The reli ance on empirical data, however, provides a more satisfactory anchor than mere reliance on the intuition of the Court. Moreover, it finds a robust role for other institutions in protecting constitutional rights, a refreshing change from the Court's usual approach to the task of pro tecting rights.
Dickerson is, of course, inconsistent with Professor Klein's project. Rather than admit Miranda is prophylactic, and invite Congress to have another go at creating an alternative remedy, the Court woodenly insisted that Miranda was constitutional even though it gave no explanation of its relationship to the Fifth Amendment privilege. On Professor Klein's account, Dickerson is a missed opportunity for dialogue.162 I agree with her, though on my account, the Court owed us no explanation of how Miranda is connected to the Fifth Amendment privilege because the Court has, in effect, already provided an expla nation by moving Miranda to the Due Process Clause.
I don't claim that my Miranda-as-notice explanation fits perfectly with the entire opinion in Miranda or with all the language and analy sis in the cases that followed. I like very much Susan Klein's alterna tive explanation of the Miranda exceptions. On her account, most of the Miranda exceptions can be explained as a sort of collective good faith exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Except for Quarles,163 the cases finding exceptions to Miranda's rule of suppres sion involve failures to comply through inadvertence, rather than an attempt to gain an advantage over the suspect. In Elstad, the Court even stressed the minor, good-faith nature of the failure to provide Miranda warnings during the initial interaction.164
On this attractive account, the various collateral uses to which the state may put statements taken in violation of Miranda crucially de pend on the good-faith nature of the violation. Should the police in tentionally violate Miranda to gain an advantage, the state could then 164. The Court noted that the violation was a "simple failure to administer the warn ings," to be contrasted with "actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) . not benefit from the Miranda exceptions. This solves the problem of "questioning outside Miranda" that Professor Charles Weisselberg has documented.165
As intuitively appealing as this explanation is, its connection with the Fifth Amendment privilege is tenuous. It is hard to figure out what the officer's intentions have to do with the Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to give answers unless we assume, as Professor Klein does, that an intentional violation of Miranda is more likely to be part of a coercive environment. But compulsion depends on the perception of the suspect, not the intent of the interrogator. To tell Elstad, "I think you were involved in a robbery" might or might not be compelling.166 That the officer intended to evade Miranda does not make it more compelling. Whatever the value of the officer's intent as a bright line for locating violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege, that intent should be part of a due process balance. Perhaps Professor Klein has simply provided a better description of how the Court con ducts the Miranda due process balance than I have managed to do! CONCLUSION It should not surprise us that no theory fits perfectly with all the Miranda "data." The Miranda doctrine has evolved over three dec ades, often with Courts that were at least somewhat hostile. I have at tempted to show, throughout this Article, that a due process explana tion of Miranda and its progeny is basically consistent with the thrust of the Court's Miranda opinion itself and is a better fit with the pre scribed remedy, the waiver standard, and the subsequent case law than the two traditional explanations of Miranda -that it is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege or that it is a weak force applica tion of the Fifth Amendment that sometimes does not function the same as the strong force version of the privilege. Professor Klein's theory of the Miranda exceptions is also a worthy alternative to these standard explanations, though I think her theory partakes of due pro cess more than she admits.
When I was in law school, the seminal due process notice case in civil procedure was Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. , 1 67 holding that the bank had to provide actual notice of a judicial settle-165. This practice consists of obtaining statements by telling suspects that what they say cannot be used against them in court because they have not been given Miranda warnings. The police hope to get a statement that can be used to impeach or to find other evidence. 166. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301 (describing an officer testifying that "I told Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved in that [robbery]").
167. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) .
